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 Fear Factor: The Role of Fear in a Liberal Democracy 
Abstract 
What is the most appropriate role of fear in contemporary democratic politics?  Political figures 
and institutions harness and even create public fear for power and for maintaining order and 
structure.  This thesis explores the moral dimensions of the use of fear in politics.  I expected to 
find that not all politically premeditated uses of fear are undesirable.  Could it be morally 
acceptable then, or even praiseworthy to use politically-motivated fear in certain cases? In 
certain situations, public fear may, in fact, be used to enhance democracy.  This essay clarifies 
situations in which the political use of fear is both desirable and warranted. What must be 
avoided is the deliberative political rhetoric that uses fear in order to undermine individual 
autonomy and its inherent rationality, which is the ideal for citizens of a liberal democracy.   
“Government can be the greatest source of fear, and its structure and mentality 
must give insurance against itself.”1 
 
Keywords: fear, liberal, democracy, deontology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at xvii.	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Introduction 
Machiavelli claims that it is better to be feared than loved,2 yet can this approach really 
be upheld within a democratic political system? The psychology of fear suggests that fear may 
interfere with our rational processes. Should this concern us on a moral level if we live in a 
democracy: a political system that ideally requires its citizens to remain rational autonomous 
agents?   
 
It is clear that drumming up public fear is a very practical and oftentimes successful tactic 
for political elites.  For example, following Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, American 
citizenry—with more than a push or two from the federal government—were caught up in the 
fear that more attacks would follow if nothing was done soon.  Yet this soon slipped into an 
encouragement of domestic fear of Japanese-American spies during the Second World War.  
There has been little academic inquiry into when this inciting public fear crosses the line.  It 
seems that just about every four years the political elite remind the American public of the social, 
economic, or political crises which simply must be solved.  We know that career politicians and 
the political elite are more than able to stir up and subsequently use public fear to their 
advantage, yet when ought they do so?  If there is ever such a proper situation, can we—as 
citizens—adequately determine which instances are, in fact, moral and which are immoral?  We 
must untangle the deep paradox that we generally view fear as something to be avoided, yet we 
often expect our politicians to inform us of what we should fear most. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Trans. Luigi Ricci. 1935. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1952, at 90. 
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Methods 
Unlike many empirical studies within the political science discipline, this project is a 
piece of normative political philosophy.  This means that methodologically we are not relying on 
empirical datasets, but rather, on a careful examination of the philosophical underpinnings of 
political public policy.  Our end goal is not simply descriptive, but to approximate what—in an 
ideal world—ought to be the moral criterion used to judge the legitimacy or illegitimacy of 
public fear deliberately created or roused by political figures and institutions.  The political elite 
clearly has the power and ability to wield public fear to its own advantage, so this paper 
questions when it becomes morally unacceptable to do so. 
 
We begin with a brief introduction to the classical underpinnings of political fear as 
portrayed by a few major foundational political philosophers.  Most know Machiavelli’s famous 
saying that it is better to be feared than loved. He means this in a very practical sense, so this is 
not as useful for our moral examination.  He also discusses fear within principalities, and so 
becomes even less applicable for those of us in democracies.  Thomas Hobbes is slightly more 
applicable as a social contractarian, and claims that because humans are self-interested creatures, 
the governing authority must reign over almost every aspect of life through force and fear.  Most 
people, however, would view this type of fear as morally unacceptable.  Furthermore, Hobbes 
advocates for a fear of the political elite themselves, which is outside of the scope of this project.  
On the other hand, Cicero weighs in on the opposite end of the spectrum, claiming that a 
government that uses fear is inherently wrong in doing so.  Like Hobbes’ claim, this is outside of 
our scope in examining instances when the creator of the fear and the object of fear are one in the 
same, that is to say, the political elite.   
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After essentially dismissing the usefulness of these philosophers for the scope of this 
project, this paper turns to two of the most noteworthy modern-day writers on political fear, 
Corey Robin and Judith Shklar.  As such, we narrow the scope to examine fear created by the 
political elite of some impending crisis within liberal democracies through the moral framework 
of deontology.  Part I lays out the assumptions about the nature of autonomy and the 
psychological effects that fear and emotions have upon our rational processes.  Part II begins to 
analyze how we are to preserve the autonomy and rational decision-making skills of individuals 
within the public.  I do so by drawing out our intuitions within two case studies: the Los Angeles 
“Carmaggedon” of 2011, and the color-coded terror alert system.  Part III explores the moral 
implications of these intuitions by explicitly laying out four principles that the political elite 
ought consider when evaluating the moral legitimacy of the fear-inducing public policies they 
enact.  These four principles are the continuity principle, the proportionality principle, the 
intensity or severity principle, and the rationality principle, all of which are intrinsically tied to 
the Kantian emphasis on regarding others as ends in themselves due to an inherent respect for 
rational autonomous beings.  We then find ourselves with four distinct spectrums upon which to 
judge the moral acceptability of public policy that creates fear.  This paper then applies these 
four principles back to the two case studies, explicitly demonstrating how we formed such 
principles from both our assumptions about the nature of fear as well as from our intuitions about 
these cases.  We can then conclude by summarizing what new ground has been covered by the 
findings of this paper. 
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Classical Underpinnings 
Nicolò Machiavelli is perhaps most oft quoted on the importance of the use of fear within 
governing a people.  He famously proclaimed that it is better to be feared than loved: “[On] the 
question whether it is better to be loved more than feared, or feared more than loved. The reply 
is, that one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is 
much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be wanting”.3  What we must first ask 
ourselves is: what does Machiavelli mean by “better?”  According to Machiavelli, fear is not 
necessarily moral, but practical.  The fear of punishment is what keeps citizens in line and allows 
one to be an effective ruler.  There are those, however, who argue that Machiavelli’s admonition 
to use fear is, undergirded by a utilitarian moral appeal, which takes into consideration the good 
of the whole of society by avoiding anarchy.  This paper does not purport to settle this debate, as 
there are other reasons which we may look towards to discount Machiavelli’s applicability in our 
inquiry.  For instance, we must ask in what sort of government Machiavelli claims fear is best.  
Machiavelli writes of practical means to keep order within a principality.  Today, most of the 
developed world does not live in principalities, and under social contract theory, we have 
conferred upon the government only so much authority over us as is necessary to keep us from 
anarchy.  In short, we do not live under princes, as in Machiavelli’s time.  If we are to search for 
the moral basis for governmentally derived fear within our own society, then clearly 
Machiavelli’s writings should not be our primary focus.  
 
Thomas Hobbes, on the other hand—another classic advocate of governmentally derived 
fear—is much more applicable.  As a social contractarian, he believed that government has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Trans. Luigi Ricci. 1935. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1952, at 90. 
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legitimate authority, due to our agreement, to vest a portion of our own individual autonomy into 
a governing body.  We do so in order to escape the state of nature, which he claims would make 
life “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”4  Because Hobbes viewed humans as essentially 
self-interested, he claimed that the governing authority must reign over almost every aspect of 
life through force and fear.  While yes, our governments are based upon a similar social contract 
theory, Hobbes advocated a sovereign government which is forceful past the point of being 
morally acceptable.  Even if we discard this judgment as subjective, we see that Hobbes did not 
consider the sort of fear we are hoping to examine.  He advocated for the fear of the sovereign 
authority itself, not the fear that those in power create as something external of themselves. 
 
Cicero also followed this pattern of viewing fear within politics as creating fear of those 
who are themselves in power, though he weighed in on the opposite end of the spectrum.  Cicero 
makes the bold claim that a government that uses fear is inherently wrong in doing so.5  Corey 
Robin—in chronicling the concept of fear throughout the history of political theory—agrees with 
Cicero’s characterization of governmentally motivated fear.  Robin claims that all such fear is 
morally problematic, as it is: 
A political tool, an instrument of elite rule or insurgent advance, created and sustained by political leaders 
or activists who stand to gain something from it, either because fear helps them pursue a specific political 
goal, or because it reflects or lends support to their moral and political beliefs—or both.6   
Robin—as well as Cicero—automatically assumes that governments will take advantage 
of and abuse any use of political fear, and thus it will always be illegitimate and immoral.  On 
the other hand, Machiavelli and Hobbes—whether for practical or ideological reasons—believe 
that fear is legitimate, if not, necessary for a governing body to control its citizens.  This paper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. C. B. MacPherson. New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1985, at XIII. 
5 Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Oratore. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Print. 
6 Robin, Corey. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004, at 16.	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argues that a middle ground can be reached between these two extremes.  Political uses of public 
fear may sometimes be legitimate, while many others can be easily dismissed as illegitimate on 
moral grounds. 
 
While these classical writers are not as relevant to my specific focus, this paper takes into 
account more contemporary writers on political fear in the analysis in this paper. There are not 
many academics today who focus on political fear outside of authoritarian regimes, which is why 
this paper is unique in delving into this relatively unexplored topic.  The two more important 
contemporary writers are Corey Robin who takes a modern-day Ciceronean approach, and Judith 
Shklar who is not necessarily opposed to all forms of political fear as Robin is, but only those 
that are an abuse of power.  This paper essentially supports Shklar in my paper in assuming that 
political fear may be used legitimately in a morally acceptable manner, and it begins to clarify 
means of judging this legitimacy. 
 
Scope 
In order to focus our analysis, we may look specifically at the public fear of an external 
threat which is created by the political elite within a liberal democracy.  Many academic musings 
focus on the use of political fear within authoritarian regimes and totalitarian regimes.  While 
these studies are helpful, it is quite clear that much of the fear created is illegitimate and 
immoral.  Furthermore, for those of us lucky enough to live outside of these types of 
governments, it is not always quite so easy to determine fear’s legitimacy.  We must examine a 
fear that is much more subtle and harder to see, yet it is still public fear nonetheless and at times 
such a fear seems to undermine the function of the democracy itself. 
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We can therefore narrow our inquiry to solely examine the uses of fear within 
democracies.  For those of us who live within a democracy, we believe that we have entered into 
a social contract with our body politic, giving up certain liberties in exchange for protection from 
the fear that accompanies the anarchy within the state of nature .7  According to classic social 
contractarians like John Locke8 and Jean Jacques Rousseau,9 we have made the rational choice to 
avoid such fear and enter into society under a governing body.  What this implies for our 
examination is that if fear undermines rationality, it would also undermine the social contract by 
leading to that from which it seeks to save us—fear of losing our life and property—as well as 
undermining the process through which it is legitimated—voluntary rational decision-making.  
Therefore, if a fear is to be considered fully legitimate under social contract theory within 
democracy, it must avoid these two pitfalls. 
 
This consideration of the underpinnings of democracy sheds light on why the only 
political schema upon which we must focus—if we hope to maximize our chance of finding and 
defining a morally legitimate use or creation of public fear—is within a liberal democracy.  How 
does liberalism affect our inquiry?  According to thinkers such as Judith Shklar, liberalism is the 
ideal version of democracy under which no individual is subject to the arbitrary power of 
another, and therefore, “Liberalism is monogamously, faithfully, and permanently married to 
democracy.”10  Liberalism, according to Shklar, attempts to ensure that as much liberty and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1980. 
8 Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1980. 
9 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “On the Social Contract.” In The Basic Political Writings. Trans. Donald Cress and Peter 
Gay. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1987.   
10	  Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 19.	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freedom as is possible is extended to individuals to live their version of the good life.  It “has 
only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of 
personal freedom.  Every adult should be able to make as many effective decisions without fear 
or favor about as many aspects of her or his life as is compatible with the like freedom of every 
other adult.”11  This overarching goal is made up of the Liberalism of Natural Rights—to life, 
liberty, and property12— Liberalism of Personal Development,13 and Liberalism of Fear.14   
 
Judith Shklar has been at the forefront of the movement to incorporate the avoidance of 
illegitimate fear into the main goals of liberalism, yet some, such as Robin, wholeheartedly 
disagree with the movement: “By seeing liberalism as solely a solution and not also a problem, 
the writers [like Judith Shklar] who proffer these notions of fear lead support, wittingly or 
unwittingly, to the forces in society that have much to gain from fear.”15  What Robin seems to 
ignore is the “notions of fear” which Shklar and other liberalism of fear advocates support.  
Shklar argues that “liberalism of fear has very clear aims—the reduction of fear and cruelty”16 as 
it “regards abuses of public powers in all regimes with equal trepidation”17  Whereas Shklar is 
skeptical of abuses of fear and cruelty, Robin views all fear as an abuse.  What we must identify, 
then, is what actually counts as an “abuse,” and is hence, immoral.  According to liberalism, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 3. 
12 Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1980. 
13 Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 2001. 
14 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 9. 
15 Robin, Corey. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004, at 16. 
16 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 14. 
17 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 9. 
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that which undermines reasonable freedom, or “the presence of alternatives, between which one 
may choose,”18 without proper legitimacy to do so.   
 
First, however, we must know which types of fear we are examining as potentially 
morally acceptable.  When we combine the two most prominent recent scholars on political 
fear—Shklar and Robin—we find that there are two types of fear: fear of the political elite 
themselves, and fear which the political elite create about something other than themselves.  The 
former is most prevalent outside of democracies, yet when corruption enters a democratic 
government, the citizens should know what recourses they have.  They know that it is 
incompatible with the liberal ideal because “systematic fear is the condition that makes freedom 
impossible, and it is aroused by the expectation of institutionalized cruelty as by nothing else.”19  
Citizenry in liberal democracies know what to do in that case.  They have at their disposal 
historically accepted legitimate means to change the situation through protests, judicial 
processes, etc.  This first category of fear is what liberalists of fear would categorize as the 
arbitrary abuse of power which can easily lead to cruelty.20   
 
On the other hand, skeptics such as Robin claim that this: 
Kind of fear arises from the social, political, and economic hierarchies that divide people. Though this kind 
of fear is also created, wielded, or manipulated by political leaders, its specific purpose or function is 
internal intimidation, to use sanctions or the threat of sanctions to ensure that one group retains or augments 
its power at the expense of another [usually based on] inequities of wealth, status, and power.”21   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at xvii.	  
19 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 11. 
20 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 11. 
21	  Robin, Corey. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004, at 18.	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Robin discounts the possibility that these sorts of threats can be used in deterring crime 
and keeping the public safe.  Obviously there can be abuses, which is why “we should [not] 
allow more acts to be criminalized than is necessary for our mutual safety,”22 yet they are 
necessary and Robin has miscategorized them.  The politician himself, in an ideal liberal 
democracy, is not the judge, jury, and executioner, and so the threat of sanctions is the threat of a 
system which is external to that politician, placing deterrence firmly within the second type of 
fear. 
 
The second type of fear is the fear of something other than the political elite.  There are 
two types of fear within this category: the fear of the disciplinary system, and the fear of crisis.  
As long as they are used correctly, they both should have the potential to be morally acceptable.  
The fear of the disciplinary system as a deterrent for crimes has long been termed legitimate 
upon both philosophical grounds, yet disputed on practical grounds.  Justifying deterring crimes 
is nothing new.  Rousseau was one of the first social contractarians to explain why the governing 
body politic has the authority to punish criminals.  In his Social Contract Chapter V, entitled “On 
the Right of Life or Death,” he argued that the body politic has the authority over the life of a 
criminal as part of the social contract:  “It is in order to avoid being the victim of an assassin that 
a person consents to die, where he to become one.  According to this treaty, far from disposing of 
his own life, one thinks only of guaranteeing it.”23  Essentially, we all expect our own lives to be 
preserved by the body politic, and protecting against assassins is one way the state can do this.  
Since we all consent that we would like other assassins murdered, we immediately consent—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 18. 
23 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “On the Social Contract.” In The Basic Political Writings. Trans. Donald Cress and Peter 
Gay. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1987, at II.V. 
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within the confines of the social contract—to be killed if we ourselves become an assassin and 
become a threat to other citizen’s lives.24  Furthermore, “it is not so much the actuality of a 
threat, but the imagined idea of a threat” 25 that deters criminals and keeps us safe, which is the 
government’s main duty under social contract theory.  Even under liberalism, “A minimal level 
of fear is implied in any system of law,”26 and hence “any government must use the threat of 
punishment.”27  It has been disputed, however, how effectively the threat of punishment actually 
deters crime itself.28  This paper does not purport to resolve this debate here, as its focus in this 
inquiry is specific to the last type of fear which is discussed next. 
 
The altogether novel application of fear within a liberal democracy is the last type of fear 
of a crisis which is external to the political elite, whether that crisis is social, economic, military, 
etc.  Such crises normally come in the form of say, an external enemy, or threats of impending 
economic or social collapse.  The reason which Robin is skeptical of this creation of fear as well 
is that he sees it as artificial.   “Leaders or militants can define what is or ought to be the public’s 
chief object of fear. Political fear of this sort almost always preys upon some real threat—it 
seldom, if ever, is created out of nothing.”29  If there is indeed a “real threat,” then should we 
expect the political elite to keep that information from the public?  No, we reasonably expect our 
politicians to inform us about what we should worry.  This need not be every item which crosses 
their desk, but there is an expectation on the part of the general public that our elected officials 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “On the Social Contract.” In The Basic Political Writings. Trans. Donald Cress and Peter 
Gay. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1987. 
25 Robin, Corey. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004, at 25. 
26 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 11. 
27 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 12. 
28 Gabriel, Ute and Werner Greve. “The Psychology of Fear of Crime: Conceptual and  
Methodological Perspectives.” British Journal of Criminology. 43.3(2003): 600-614. 
29 Robin, Corey. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004, at 16.	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and other highly ranking political elite will selectively inform us.  Robin is correct in that this 
guiding of public fear should not be manipulative, but it remains unclear whether every such 
instance “preys upon” the citizenry.  Our inquiry, therefore, aims to examine in which cases a 
real threat is morally acceptable, if ever it is.  The fear of crisis is not normally the focus of most 
academic writings on politically-based fear, and as such, there is much to gain simply from 
exploring new ground. 
 
Moral Criterion 
For the sake of this examination, we will use deontology as a moral criterion.  Obviously 
we must choose a moral framework through which to assess the uses of fear, yet there are some 
frameworks, such as Divine Command Theory, that many would disregard as incompatible with 
the social contractarian roots of liberal democracies.  We are left, then to choose between 
consequentialism and deontology.  Consequentialism—also known popularly as utilitarianism—
is the Millian moral code which claims that the act which is most moral is that whose 
consequences yield the most positive benefits for the most amount of people while 
simultaneously limiting the negative outcomes.30  On the other hand, deontology derives from 
Kant’s theory that an act is moral out of an intentional duty as a rational being and justifiably so 
regardless of the consequences.31  This paper does not claim to be able to settle the centuries old 
debate over which is objectively a better means of measuring morality.  Therefore, in some 
respects the choice to use deontology rests partly upon an arbitrary choice to use it in this first 
attempt to delineate legitimate uses of this specific type of fear. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 2001. 
31 Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. James Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company Inc, 1981. 
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Of course, consequentialism is a tempting framework when working with morals at the 
societal level, and though consequentialism and deontology are not mutually exclusive and are 
sometimes compatible, consequentialism in this case would become too problematic.  Imagine a 
schema in which consequentialist utilitarianism were used to justify political elite-created fear.  
A politician could easily justify many actions with the claim that it is good for the whole of 
society.  The problem is that if we assume that fear undermines an individual’s rationality—even 
to some extent—then an individual within the public would not be able to object in a completely 
free, rational, autonomous manner, and so would have to trust the politician implicitly.  One can 
easily see how this can quickly become problematic if any politician were corrupt.  Beyond that, 
even a well-intentioned consequentialist could easily be carried too far, and there stands far too 
much to lose if we depend on this.   
 
On the other hand, if we utilize deontology, we would stay true to the social contractarian 
roots of liberal democracies which place authority and trust in the individual’s rationality.  Thus, 
why the main moral quality we are looking to satisfy as we search into the moral acceptability of 
fear is to preserve—not undermine—a human’s rational autonomy.  One may object that a 
consequentialist moral framework is at its core based upon a rational calculation of costs and 
benefits of any given decision, and so inherently respects and preserves human rational 
autonomy.  Yes, the rational autonomy of the agent making the moral choice would be 
preserved, but—as we find in later in this paper that fear undermines rational processes—such a 
preservation of rational autonomy will most likely not be afforded to citizens who are affected by 
the political elite’s decisions.  Deontology, on the other hand, requires the moral agent to take 
into consideration the rational autonomy of other moral agents, as a subsidiary quality which 
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falls out of a deontological moral standard that individuals must be considered ends in 
themselves, never a means only.32  One implication which follows includes a caution for election 
season.  During elections when political elites drum up the fear of crises to advance their 
campaign, they must be careful not to create that fear in the individual citizens only for their own 
ends of being elected.  In other words, the crisis must be a real threat. 
  
Part 1: The Assumptions 
We see then, that the moral quality of fear is based on how it influences autonomy on the 
individual level, but also at the collective democratic level of autonomy. We must first 
understand the nature of autonomy, as well as the nature of fear as an emotion that might 
undermine that autonomy. 
 
Nature of Autonomy 
There are roughly two broad ways to conceive of autonomy as it exists under a social 
contract: Hobbesian Contractualism and Kantian Contractualism.33  A Hobbesian version of 
contractualism presupposes that people are selfish, and as such, must be told what is best for 
them by the sovereign or government.  What is moral, then, is for each to pursue his or her own 
self-interest as guided by the government, since individuals have voluntarily transferred much of 
their autonomy over their lives to the body politic when they entered into society.34  Under 
Kantian contractualism, autonomy is preserved only through conceptions of governmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. James Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company Inc, 1981. 
33 Christman, John. “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. N.p., 11 
August 2009. Web. 12 Dec. 2011. 
34	  Christman, John. “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. N.p., 11 
August 2009. Web. 12 Dec. 2011.	  
Stillman 16 
	  
structures which preserve an individual’s dignity as a human being and respects his or her view 
of the “good life” and does not impose conceptions of the “good life” upon them.  A moral code 
that could be the object of agreement among such rational individuals is thus a publicly justified 
morality. 35  While there is much more that can be said aside from this brief introduction to these 
two types of contractualism, this paper does not claim to settle this debate here, as it is outside of 
its scope.   
 
All we must know is that Kantian contractualism is most compatible with the 
deontological framework we are using, and so the view of autonomy we are to use should derive 
from it. What follows is essentially that preserving one’s autonomy is of the utmost importance, 
and—as under liberalism—we must be given as much freedom as possible to rationally make 
decisions about our life, including our government.  Therefore, if an appropriate role of fear is 
found through not undermining our individual autonomy, then we must avoid undermining our 
rationality. 
 
The Nature of Fear and Emotions 
Do emotions—specifically fear—undermine an individual’s rationality?  If they do, then 
we must be careful in how to proceed in finding a potentially moral use of public fear.  Some 
argue that fear is not antagonistic to rationality.  For instance, Ronald Sousa claims that we 
choose which emotion to feel by thinking: “in terms of the paradigm scenario alone, the emotion 
that fits it is by definition rational.”36  He goes on to argue that “Emotions are intentional.”37 38  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Christman, John. “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. N.p., 11  
August 2009. Web. 12 Dec. 2011.	  
36 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 149. 
37 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 252. 
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Because “emotions themselves are already judgments…every emotion is already a matter of 
judgment,”39 40 and hence “I am as responsible for my emotions as I am for the judgments I 
make”41 because there is a rationality built in.  “Emotions require rationality (the ability to 
manipulate concepts).”42  Michael Stocker furthers this argument, claiming that emotion is tied 
up with the intellect, and as such, requires just as much inherent rationality and training.43 
  
Yet when we examine closer, we find that these arguments are feeble.  While there may 
be elements of emotions that are tied up with rationality, those arguments ignore the clear 
biological and sociological aspects of emotions.  Fear—and all emotions for that matter—are tied 
to brain activity.  We see an inherent biological aspect to emotions—including fear—which 
creates an instinctual response that we cannot fully control.  “It [fear] is a mental as well as 
physical reaction, and it is common to animals as well as to human beings.”44  In the state of 
nature, fear is extremely useful in keeping us alive through responses such as the automatic 
“fight or flight response.”  Ronald Sousa argues that the “biological function [of emotions] is to 
take up the slack in the rational determination of judgment and desire, by fixing salience of 
objects of attention and inquiry, and preferred inference patterns.”45  Emotions are not simply 
something we can always control through reasoned thinking, as some reactions are simply 
hardwired into our brains in a physical manner. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Nussbaum, Martha. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, at 27. 
39 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 258. 
40 Nussbaum, Martha. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, at 19. 
41 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 261. 
42 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 278. 
43 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 323. 
44 Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 11. 
45 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 148.	  
Stillman 18 
	  
 
On the other hand, another way in which emotions are out of the scope of our rational 
processes is that besides biological neuroscience, “emotions are social constructs,”46 as James 
Averill argues.  Rorty claims that people develop “emotional repertoires” through experience but 
intentionally choose between them.47  We may claim to be choosing rationally between possible 
responses, yet our experience has shaped what responses we see as rational.  We see what works 
for our society when we choose fear as the response to a certain stimulus, and so are limited in 
which emotional responses will be available to us. 
 
Because fear and other emotions have very little grounding in rationality, and can even 
work against rationality in a sort of “akrasia of emotions,” 48 we can safely assume that in most 
instances fear will undermine rationality to some extent, even a very small amount.  Essentially, 
we can skip the details of the psychology of fear as long as we understand that fear—and other 
emotions—have very little grounding in rationality, and typically work against rational 
processes.  We must take this into account when examining how much that fear will then 
undermine our autonomy, and hence render that public fear immoral and illegitimate.	  
 
Part 2: Analysis  
In order to analyze which fear is legitimate and potentially moral, we must take into 
account what we have found as the effects of fear on our capacity to be autonomous rational 
decision-makers.  Ideally we wish to preserve the autonomy and rational decision-making skills 
of individuals within the public.  How exactly do we do that considering that we have just found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 37. 
47 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 
48 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, at 103.	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that emotions, and specifically fear, more often than not undermine rational decision-making 
processes? First we can start with case studies in order to pull out our intuitions from real world 
examples. 
 
Next we examine two relatively simple case studies in order to distill our intuitions about 
legitimacy in the case of political fear.  Such intuitions can hopefully later be applied to more 
complex situations.  Practically applying our theoretical framework to real world examples is 
useful in order to find principles that apply within those particular instances as well as within 
politics more generally.  We would ideally like to find a way to evaluate the most complicated 
and widespread instances of political fear of crisis.  For instance, we would like to explain and 
evaluate the red scare, yet there were many variables at play as well as a complex social climate 
which had built up over the course of the Cold War.  By examining smaller more easily-
manageable instances of similar types of fear, we can get closer to approximating the role of the 
differing elements, since there are fewer elements at play overall.  This method also seems the 
best way to breach below the surface of a hitherto relatively unexplored topic.  Let us begin by 
looking at two much smaller instantiations of such fear.  First, we have the intuition that there 
was something illegitimate about the fear roused by the department of homeland security’s color-
coded terror alert system.  Second, we can also examine the intuitions we have that the fear 
employed by the local Los Angeles government this past summer for the 405 freeway closure or 
“carmageddon” is a morally benign use of fear. 
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Color-Coded Terror Alert System 
Our first case study is centered around the Department of Homeland Defense’s color-
coded terror alert system.  Shortly following the September 11th terrorist attacks of the World 
Trade Center in New York City, the Bush administration began a war in the Middle East deemed 
a “War on Terror”—a rhetoric which was chosen carefully to instill a continual sense of fear 
within American citizens.  This paper does not discuss every aspect of this fear of the external 
enemies which was intentionally drummed up during this period, as many have argued that this 
was indeed a use of fear on the part of the political elite.  Here we focus specifically on the terror 
alert system which the Department of Homeland Security quickly began instituting as essentially 
a sliding scale indicator of the current threat of terrorist attack.  
 
The intuitions of many who lived in the United States during this time period place this 
alert system as illegitimate or at the very least ineffective.  People were constantly exposed to the 
fear, and were disquieted that there was never an option for “no chance of terror attack.”  
Further, there was almost no way for a normal citizen to verify the rationale behind any changes 
in terror alert level.  The color simply changed with little apparent reason or rhyme, and normal 
citizens were told to become more or less afraid.  Many claimed that “terror alerts [are] part of a 
larger agenda of fear-based social conditioning by the government.”49  But what is it that leads to 
such intuitions?  The next section attempts to draw out the principles underlying such 
disapproval of this political use of fear. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Nimmo, Kurt. “Fear-Based Terror Alerts To Become Mandatory on Cell Phones.”  
InfoWars.com, 10 May 2011. http://www.infowars.com/fear-based-terror-alerts-to-become-mandatory-on-cell-
phones/  
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405 Freeway Closure or “Carmageddon” 
 Though the closing of the 405 Freeway for a weekend is a much smaller event than a 
nation-wide continuous terrorist alert system, what had been deemed “Carmageddon” by locals 
is still, nonetheless, a perfect example of the political elite instituting a public fear of crisis on a 
smaller scale.  Traffic has always been a sore spot for Los Angeles residents, and the news that 
Los Angeles County was closing down the heart of one of the most frequented stretches of road 
in the summer of 2011 to demolish a bridge in order to widen the road was a source of concern.  
Local government quickly adopted the term carmageddon to refer to the weekend-long closure 
and instituted scare tactics, explaining to Angelenos that they ought to leave town or else stay 
home so as remain safe and avoid being caught in gridlock on the surrounding roads.   
 
Because of this carefully-planned creation of just enough public fear, newspapers widely 
proclaimed the construction project to be a success.50  The freeway reopened early, and so many 
people heeded the advice of fearful media outlets and local government officials that the 
freeways and streets of Los Angeles were clearer that weekend than almost any other in a 
historically traffic-ridden city.  We see, then, that—just as in the case of the color-coded terror 
alert system—we have intuitions about the legitimacy of the fear tactics used by the political 
elite, and in the next section we will examine more closely what exactly undergirds these 
intuitions. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Weiss, Kenneth and Molly Hennessy-Fiske and Andrew Khouri. “Carmageddon: 'Mission  
accomplished,' says Villaraigosa as 405 Freeway Reopens Early.” The Los Angeles Times, 18 July 2011. 
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Part 3: Moral Implications 
Four Principles 
From a combination of these case studies and the conclusion which fell out of our 
assumptions about fear, we can glean four principles.  First is the continuity principle: the more 
continual a fear, the more illegitimate it becomes. People will become desensitized to it, leading 
to larger psychological problems.  The desensitization will also ultimately undermine the original 
intent of creating the fear.  Since this would diminish the utility of using fear in the first place, a 
consequentialist would also employ this principle in that a fear to which the public is 
desensitized retains very few useful consequences.  In the case of this first principle, then, 
consequentialists and deontologists would agree that continual fears tend towards illegitimacy. 
 
Second is the proportionality principle: the more proportional to the threat, the more 
legitimate the fear will be. The object of fear must be a real threat at the time the fear is roused.  
Shklar had the early workings of this principle within her works in that she claimed that what is 
moral is “a person who respects other people without condescension, arrogance, humility, or 
fear. He or she does not insult others with lies or cruelty, both of which mar one’s own character 
no less than they injure one’s victims.”51  By only using public fear when there actually is a real 
threat, we can more adequately meet this moral standard which Shklar seems to have set.   
 
Third is the intensity or severity principle: that the more intense or acute the fear 
becomes, the more it undermines rational autonomous decision-making and so the more 
illegitimate it becomes.  This principle is derived directly from the psychological effects of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” Political Thought & Political Thinkers. Ed. Stanley Hoffmann.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 3-20, at 15.	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nature of fear, and yet has such strong implications for what is morally acceptable fear and what 
is illegitimate fear.   
 
Finally, the rationality principle simply states that the clearer a rationale the political elite 
provide to the public, then the more legitimate the fear becomes, as it intrinsically respects the 
individuals’ rational autonomy.  We can more adequately see how each of these principles works 
when we apply them back to Carmageddon and the color coded terror alert system. 
 
Spectrum of morality of fear 
Notice that these are principles that exist on a spectrum and not as conditions to be met 
because in talking about morality there is gray area.  The extremes are relatively easy to 
categorize, but when particular instances fall somewhere in the middle it becomes a more subtle  
distinction.  Representing this visually, we find a spectrum upon which to place individual 
instances in order to evaluate their moral acceptability or prohibition based upon how much the 
fear in question would undermine rational autonomy within the four categories of the principles. 
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Morally Prohibited   Morally Acceptable 
Continuous          Non-Continuous 
  
Non-Proportional        Proportional Threat	  
 
Severe          Non-Severe 
 
No Appeal to Rationale      Appeals to Rationale 
 
 
We see, then, that there is a spectrum from that which undermines rational autonomy and 
is morally prohibited to that which is morally acceptable.  Similarly, we find parallel spectrums  
from continuous to non-continuous fears, from non-proportional to proportional to threat, from 
severe to non-severe threats, and from that which has no appeal to rationale to that which does 
appeal to rationale.   
 
Application to Case Studies 
We can apply these principles back to the case studies and see that carmageddon clearly 
falls on the morally benign or morally acceptable side.  It was a fear that was non-continuous, 
with only a few month build up for a weekend-long closure of the freeway. It was proportional to 
the threat since the local governments claimed traffic and safety as the main issues. There was no 
life-or-death sort of fear employed.  Along these lines, it was not severe fear. And it appealed to 
the public’s rationality by explaining that if a major freeway is closed then there will be traffic.  
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In the same way, the color coded terror alert clearly falls on the morally illegitimate side.  
It was continuous and so people became desensitized to the fear. At the same time, the intent was 
to drum up a constant fear by having the threat level raised and lowered but never go away 
entirely.  Some argue that the terror level was not adjusted up or down in response to some real 
threat.  The fear it created was meant to be severe fear of fatal attacks from a foreign enemy.  
And finally, there was little appeal to a rationale for why the level was raised or lowered. Of 
course, for national security reasons it is problematic to reveal too much information, but at the 
same time, the public only saw that the threat level was raised or lowered, not the reason behind 
the change. 
 
Conclusion 
We can conclude then, that within a liberal democracy, when we use deontology as a 
moral framework to examine the fear political elites rouse of an external impending crisis, such a 
fear is ethical or legitimate if it follows the four principles we have outlined. 
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